En estos momentos en España se está expandiendo la denominada mediación intercultural institucionalizada, como consecuencia del aumento de la cifra de inmigrantes entre los habitantes de nuestro país. Se trata de actividades llevadas a cabo por ONG’s e incluso por los servicios sociales de la nación de acogida. Durante los años 90 en España se inicia esta tipología de mediación. En consonancia con Giménez (1997: 127), entendemos la mediación intercultural como una modalidad más dentro del amplio campo de la mediación. (...) No existe en la actualidad una metodología aceptada y reconocida por los expertos en la materia, como consecuencia de su reciente expansión. En este artículo nuestros objetivos se centran en describir diversas técnicas de mediación y reflexionamos sobre su posible aplicación a los contextos interculturales, tal como hacía Giménez (2001) con las tres grandes escuelas de mediación (el método Harvard, el transformativo y el circular-narrativo). Además de revisar las ya citadas tres grandes escuelas, abordaremos las metodologías de Haynes y Haynes, Acland, Billikopf, Boqué y Ury. (shrink)

Over the years, researchers of numerous fields have suggested different criteria and conventions for the transcription of oral samples. Current practice by workers who carry out transcriptions in the Spanish legal system is not standardized and does not follow any general criteria. Indeed, the standards followed by professionals in this context are characterized by their heterogeneity. This contribution highlights the benefits of adhering to a particular set of criteria and conventions agreed upon by 115 transcribers to make the transcription process (...) more efficient, improve its comprehension and add to the value of transcriptions as key documents within the legal system that may have a direct impact on the right of the parties involved. (shrink)

As a topic, organization design is poorly understood. While it is featured in most management books as a chapter dedicated to organizational structures, it is unclear whether organization design is a one-off event or an ongoing process. Thus, it has traditionally been understood to be the same as an organizational configuration, with neat lines of communication and distribution of responsibilities following pre-set typologies. Yet what can be said to constitute organizational structure in this first half of the 21st century? The (...) extraordinary growth of digital communications, the decreasing relevance of hierarchical bureaucracies, and the general demise of command-and-control have all but decimated the traditional notion of organizational structure. Organization design needs a theoretical revamping. Using a mix of design and social science theories and concepts, Rodrigo Magalhães outlines a new human-centric interpretation of design, design principles, and design culture. He puts forward a paradigm where the organization, for purposes of its design, is considered to be a social actor in a permanent state of transformation, with significant repercussions for social and economic life. He also proposes a model of 'leaderful organization design', distinguished as practice-based, guided by values of democratic participation, and driven by design logics which places meaning-making and meaning-taking at the center of organizational life and can be adopted and adapted to suit different environments. (shrink)

In addressing the fundamental issues of Merleau-Ponty’s last ontology, for which Being is an expressive movement, this paper focuses on Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on painting, sculpture and, mainly, cinema. Two reasons justify such a choice. The first one is that Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on films as artistic objects are starting to become better known, while an exclusive privilege has been too long given to his texts on painting, sculpture and literature. An enrichment of our reading of his aesthetics and ontology is thus (...) made possible. The second reason is that, although it is true that Merleau-Ponty’s general aesthetic doctrine introduces us to the question of movement, of its meaning and its ontological status as “expression,” it is even more true that, in the framework of this general aesthetic doctrine, his analyses of the mode of expression of cinematographic images become especially significant. (shrink)

In addressing the fundamental issues of Merleau-Ponty’s last ontology, for which Being is an expressive movement, this paper focuses on Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on painting, sculpture and, mainly, cinema. Two reasons justify such a choice. The first one is that Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on films as artistic objects are starting to become better known, while an exclusive privilege has been too long given to his texts on painting, sculpture and literature. An enrichment of our reading of his aesthetics and ontology is thus (...) made possible. The second reason is that, although it is true that Merleau-Ponty’s general aesthetic doctrine introduces us to the question of movement, of its meaning and its ontological status as “expression,” it is even more true that, in the framework of this general aesthetic doctrine, his analyses of the mode of expression of cinematographic images become especially significant. (shrink)

O presente estudo encontra-se inserido mais diretamente nas linhas de pesquisa de História da Filosofia Moderna e do Pensamento Ético-Político, temos alguns estudos filosóficos sobre o pacifismo erasmiano na “Queixa da Paz” como aqueles realizados por Meulen (1990), Hoffmann (2000), Kinsella e Carr (2007), Martín e Chornet (2007), Dungen (2008) e Christi (2009).

For over a decade neuroscience has uncovered that appropriate decision-making in daily life decisions results from a strong interplay between cognition and covert biases produced by emotional processes. This interplay is particularly important in social contexts: lesions in the pathways supporting these processes provoke serious impairments on social behavior. One important mechanism in social contexts is empathy, fundamental for appropriate social behavior. This paper presents arguments supporting this connection between cognition and emotion, in individual as well as in social contexts. (...) The central claim of this paper is that biologically inspired cognitive architectures ought to include these mechanisms. A taxonomy of computational models addressing emotions is presented, together with a brief survey of the research published in this area. The Prisoner Dilemma game is used as a case study exposing the trade-off between individual rationality and cooperative behavior. Experiments using a simple implementation of empathy and emotion expression, employing an Iterated Prisoner Dilemma setup, illustrate the emergence of a cooperative behavior mutually beneficial for both players. (shrink)

The embodiment approach has shown that motor neural networks are involved in the processing of action verbs. There is developmental evidence that embodied effects on verb processing are already present in early years. Yet, the ontogenetic origin of this motor reuse in action verbs remains unknown. This longitudinal study investigates the co-occurrence of manual verbs and actions during mother-child daily routines when children were 1 to 2 and 2 to 3 years old. Eight mother-child dyads were video-recorded in 3-month intervals (...) across 12 months, and the timing of verbs and manual actions were coded by independent observers. Results showed that the probability of matched verb-action co-occurrences were much higher than that of random co-occurrences for Group 1 and Group 2, respectively. The distributions of the verb-action temporal intervals in both groups were quite symmetrical and skewed with the peak corresponding to both 0.00 s synchronic intervals and the shortest +5 s interval. Mother-led instances occurred in both groups whereas child-led instances were restricted to Group 2. Mothers pragmatically aligned their verbal productions, since they repeatedly used those verbs they shared with their children’s repertoire. In conclusion, the early multisensory communicative and manipulative scene affords grounding of verb meanings on the ongoing actions, facilitating verb-action pairing in the realm of social interactions, providing a new dimension to the prevailing solipsistic approach to embodiment. (shrink)

The Hiatus of Sense. Framing and Cinematic Montage according to Eisenstein and Merleau-Ponty“Cinema portrays movement, but how? Is it, as we are inclined to believe, by copying more closely the changes of place? We may presume not, since slow motion shows a body floating between objects like seaweed, but not moving itself.” This interrogation constitutes the only allusion to the cinema in Eye and Mind, and, by reading the argumentation developed in this work, one cannot help thinking that the role (...) which it reserves for cinema is, finally, to be the simple revelation of the illusions of naïve consciousness in relation to movement. Nothing is said about the expressive movement of cinema itself. Nothing is said about the logic of cinematic sense and therefore of cinematic language. Does this mean that Merleau-Ponty, up to the end of his life, had a relationship to cinema that was merely supplementary, that he always privileged the analysis of pictorial, musical, or literary aesthetic experiences?In contrast, we propose to establish that his philosophical position cannot be characterized by the idea that he held the cinema in an ancillary role and status because, in other texts, Merleau-Ponty knew how to decipher in cinema, to a large degree, the enigma of movement as the form of expressivity. But we will argue here that he knew it only up to a certain point. This is what a discussion with the theoretical writings of Sergei Einstein will have to establish. We shall seek to rediscover the philosophical – and even ontological – reasons for this state of things which, if one wants to preserve for cinema the characteristic that allows it to be stimulating for thought, must not under any circumstances be interpreted as the simple result of Merleau-Ponty not having enough interest in the cinema.Lo scarto del senso. Inquadratura e montaggio cinematografico secondo Eisenstein e Merleau-Ponty«Il cinema ci dà il movimento, ma come? Forse, come generalmente si crede, riproducendo il più ravvicinatamente possibile il cambiamento di luogo ? Pare proprio di no: infatti il rallentatore ci mostra un corpo che fluttua tra gli oggetti come un’alga, ma che non si muove»Questa interrogazione costituisce la sola allusione al cinema ne L’occhio e lo spirito e, leggendo l’argomentazione sviluppata in quest’opera, non si può evitare di pensare che il ruolo che essa riserva al cinema sia, in fin dei conti, quello di essere un semplice rivelatore di illusioni della coscienza ingenua di fronte al movimento. Nulla viene detto a proposito del movimento espressivo del cinema in se stesso. Nulla viene detto della logica del senso cinematografico e dunque del linguaggio cinematografico. Questo significa forse che Merleau-Ponty ha avuto, fino alla fine della sua vita, solo un rapporto accessorio con il cinema, e che ha sempre privilegiato l’analisi delle esperienze estetiche pittoriche, musicali o letterarie?Ci proponiamo, al contrario, di stabilire che la sua posizione filosofica non può essere caratterizzata dal mantenimento del cinema in un ruolo ed in uno statuto ancillare, poiché, in altri testi, Merleau-Ponty ha saputo in gran parte decifrare l’enigma del movimento come forma d’espressività al cinema. Questo è quanto un confronto con gli scritti teorici di Sergei Eisenstein ci dovrà permettere di stabilire. Cercheremo di reperire le ragioni filosofiche – ed ontologiche – di questo stato di cose, che non deve essere in nessun caso interpretato, se si vuole conservare il suo carattere stimolante per il pensiero, come il semplice risultato di uno scarso interesse di Merleau-Ponty per il cinema. (shrink)

The Hiatus of Sense. Framing and Cinematic Montage according to Eisenstein and Merleau-Ponty“Cinema portrays movement, but how? Is it, as we are inclined to believe, by copying more closely the changes of place? We may presume not, since slow motion shows a body floating between objects like seaweed, but not moving itself.” This interrogation constitutes the only allusion to the cinema in Eye and Mind, and, by reading the argumentation developed in this work, one cannot help thinking that the role (...) which it reserves for cinema is, finally, to be the simple revelation of the illusions of naïve consciousness in relation to movement. Nothing is said about the expressive movement of cinema itself. Nothing is said about the logic of cinematic sense and therefore of cinematic language. Does this mean that Merleau-Ponty, up to the end of his life, had a relationship to cinema that was merely supplementary, that he always privileged the analysis of pictorial, musical, or literary aesthetic experiences?In contrast, we propose to establish that his philosophical position cannot be characterized by the idea that he held the cinema in an ancillary role and status because, in other texts, Merleau-Ponty knew how to decipher in cinema, to a large degree, the enigma of movement as the form of expressivity. But we will argue here that he knew it only up to a certain point. This is what a discussion with the theoretical writings of Sergei Einstein will have to establish. We shall seek to rediscover the philosophical – and even ontological – reasons for this state of things which, if one wants to preserve for cinema the characteristic that allows it to be stimulating for thought, must not under any circumstances be interpreted as the simple result of Merleau-Ponty not having enough interest in the cinema.Lo scarto del senso. Inquadratura e montaggio cinematografico secondo Eisenstein e Merleau-Ponty«Il cinema ci dà il movimento, ma come? Forse, come generalmente si crede, riproducendo il più ravvicinatamente possibile il cambiamento di luogo? Pare proprio di no: infatti il rallentatore ci mostra un corpo che fluttua tra gli oggetti come un’alga, ma che non si muove»Questa interrogazione costituisce la sola allusione al cinema ne L’occhio e lo spirito e, leggendo l’argomentazione sviluppata in quest’opera, non si può evitare di pensare che il ruolo che essa riserva al cinema sia, in fin dei conti, quello di essere un semplice rivelatore di illusioni della coscienza ingenua di fronte al movimento. Nulla viene detto a proposito del movimento espressivo del cinema in se stesso. Nulla viene detto della logica del senso cinematografico e dunque del linguaggio cinematografico. Questo significa forse che Merleau-Ponty ha avuto, fino alla fine della sua vita, solo un rapporto accessorio con il cinema, e che ha sempre privilegiato l’analisi delle esperienze estetiche pittoriche, musicali o letterarie?Ci proponiamo, al contrario, di stabilire che la sua posizione filosofica non può essere caratterizzata dal mantenimento del cinema in un ruolo ed in uno statuto ancillare, poiché, in altri testi, Merleau-Ponty ha saputo in gran parte decifrare l’enigma del movimento come forma d’espressività al cinema. Questo è quanto un confronto con gli scritti teorici di Sergei Eisenstein ci dovrà permettere di stabilire. Cercheremo di reperire le ragioni filosofiche – ed ontologiche – di questo stato di cose, che non deve essere in nessun caso interpretato, se si vuole conservare il suo carattere stimolante per il pensiero, come il semplice risultato di uno scarso interesse di Merleau-Ponty per il cinema. (shrink)

Contra lo que podría haberse esperado, el crecimiento de la pobreza y de las desigualdades en América Latina a consecuencia de las reformas económicas no ha provocado la quiebra de las democracias ni situaciones de ingobernabilidad. Los actuales problemas de la democracia en América Latina, en cambio, surgen de una crisis de la representación política, que en parte es consecuencia de la historia previa de los partidos como mecanismos de intercambio particularista, y en parte de su dificultad para adaptarse a (...) las demandas sociales en la nueva situación económica. (shrink)

« Qui nous sauve d’une réification de la conscience est le sauveur de la philosophie, voire son créateur ». Un phénoménologue ne peut que souscrire à une telle affirmation, dont la paternité revient à Husserl et dont la clairvoyance est tout à fait frappante. Renaud Barbaras rappelle souvent cette formule et il lui est même arrivé d’écrire qu’elle constitue « en quelque sorte [sa] boussole théorique ». Puisque boussole il y a, je vais suivre son cap pour tenter de ressaisir (...) ce qu’il en est de... (shrink)

En el marco de una investigación sobre la producción de organismos trasnacionales del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia en la ciudad de La Plata, en este trabajo sostenemos que el Viceconsulado creado allí en 2013 busca resituar a las agencias consulares de ese país en un lugar central en los procesos de diasporización desarrollados en esta localidad. Por medio del análisis de documentos y balances de la Cancillería boliviana, observaciones participantes en eventos, actividades y reuniones organizadas por las instancias consulares de (...) Bolivia y asociaciones de migrantes asentados/as en la ciudad de La Plata y entrevistas y numerosos diálogos informales con los/as principales dirigentes de estos espacios, damos cuenta de los mecanismos a partir de los cuales el Estado se involucra en los procesos de “etnización” conectando (o reforzando las conexiones entre) la trama institucional y la experiencia de la nación de las personas, como de los conflictos y resistencias que debe enfrentar en los intentos de consolidación de sus posicionamientos.El artículo repasa el desprestigio que sufrieron las entidades consulares en la región durante las últimas décadas del siglo XX y los primeros años del XXI y las estrategias que sostienen este intento de reposicionamiento. De esta manera, la tramitación de documentación y la figura de Evo Morales emergen en una trama en la que se conforma y disputa la representación y la autoridad sobre la “colectividad”. (shrink)

Entre las múltiples y variadas nuevas formas de espiritualidad contemporánea podemos destacar el chamanismo, más concretamente los neochamanismos como uno de los nuevos desarrollos espirituales a partir de la recuperación de nuestra relación ancestral con la Naturaleza y que busca en los orígenes, el acceso a una religión primigenia conservada por algunos pueblos indígenas. En este artículo tratamos de reflexionar acerca de la llegada y la extensión de dicho fenómeno a España en el marco del nuevo mercado espiritual, de esa (...) constelación místico-esotérica que vive Occidente como una forma de explicación válida ante los déficits de sentido modernos y posmodernos que nos acechan y que nos hacen volver la vista atrás. De esta forma, recuperamos viejas formas de conocimiento transcendente en las filosofías y religiones antiguas que nos sirven como nuevas estrategias a través de las cuales afrontar la realidad cotidiana. (shrink)

The present paper investigates the late ontology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, which considers being as expressive movement. The paper takes as its point of departure Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on painting, sculpture and especially cinema. Two reasons justify this choice. On the one hand, Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on film as a work of art are now starting to be better known, after they have been overshadowed by his writings on painting, sculpture or literature for a long time. This entails a considerable enrichment of our (...) interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetics and his ontology. On the other hand, if Merleau-Ponty’s general theory of aesthetics leads to questions concerning the sense and the ontological status of movement, it is certain that, within this theory, the analysis of the particular mode of expression of cinematic images gains an extraordinary relevance. (shrink)

El concepto de gobierno es inseparable del de opinión pública en la medida en que la supervivencia de todos los gobiernos depende críticamente de la conformidad de la opinión pública. Pero las democracias protegen mejor a sus gobernantes de la amenaza que encierra la opinión pública que las dictaduras. Por una parte, las elecciones confieren a los gobernantes democráticos una legitimidad de origen de la que carecen muchos dictadores por haber alcanzado el poder a través de métodos considerados ilegítimos. Por (...) otra parte, mientras la receptividad ante las demandas de la opinión pública suele reforzar la legitimidad de ejercicio de los gobiernos democráticos, se interpreta generalmente como signo de debilidad de las dictaduras. La vulnerabilidad de las dictaduras ante la opinión pública les lleva a adoptar inmediatamente medidas para defenderse de ella, combinando actuaciones represivas que inhiben a la población de expresar sus preferencias auténticas con otras que controlan los flujos de información que circulan en la sociedad. En un régimen de opinión pública cerrada no puede emerger una sociedad civil capaz de desafiar seriamente al poder. Pero si repentinamente la población comienza a acceder a información innegable que pone en evidencia la mendacidad de los gobernantes, la opinión pública cerrada puede derrumbarse rápidamente y precipitar la caída del gobierno. (shrink)

L'idée directrice de cet ouvrage est qu'une inflexion décisive caractérise les avancées théoriques proposées par Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jan Patocka et Renaud Barbaras. S'il s'agit bien encore, en effet, avec ces trois auteurs de refonder la phénoménologie (geste classique depuis Husserl), ce mouvement de refondation n'implique plus le strict recentrage de la phénoménologie sur ses possibilités propres. Il y va bien plutôt d'une refondation-extension (par là même post-phénoménologique) exigeant un déport, un mouvement vers une métaphysique, vers une autre métaphysique à déterminer. (...) On verra que l'écart entre phénoménologie et métaphysique n'en est pas pour autant annulé, mais qu'il est bien plutôt pensé à nouveaux frais comme lieu toujours reconfiguré du dépassement de l'opposition initiale - un lieu aux bordures mouvantes qui a la particularité d'entretenir, d'aggraver même le polemos entre post-phénoménologie et métaphysique non substantielle. C'est en thématisant ce lieu que les post-phénoménologies que nous étudions ici révèlent le lien intime entre phénomènes-de-monde et être non positif. (shrink)

Observations of animals engaging in apparently moral behavior have led academics and the public alike to ask whether morality is shared between humans and other animals. Some philosophers explicitly argue that morality is unique to humans, because moral agency requires capacities that are only demonstrated in our species. Other philosophers argue that some animals can participate in morality because they possess these capacities in a rudimentary form. Scientists have also joined the discussion, and their views are just as varied as (...) the philosophers’. Some research programs examine whether animals countenance specific human norms, such as fairness. Other research programs investigate the cognitive and affective capacities thought to be necessary for morality. There are two sets of concerns that can be raised by these debates. They sometimes suffer from there being no agreed upon theory of morality and no clear account of whether there is a demarcation between moral and social behavior; that is, they lack a proper philosophical foundation. They also sometimes suffer from there being disagreement about the psychological capacities evident in animals. Of these two sets of concerns—the nature of the moral and the scope of psychological capacities—we aim to take on only the second. In this chapter we defend the claim that animals have three sets of capacities that, on some views, are taken as necessary and foundational for moral judgment and action. These are capacities of care, capacities of autonomy, and normative capacities. Care, we argue, is widely found among social animals. Autonomy and normativity are more recent topics of empirical investigation, so while there is less evidence of these capacities at this point in our developing scientific knowledge, the current data is strongly suggestive. (shrink)

Neste trabalho, pretendemos avaliar criticamente algumas das teses de John McDowellsobre a natureza da virtude, tal como expostas em seu artigo “Virtue and Reason” e, ao fazê-lo,expor algumas de suas limitações. Mais especificamente, tratarei o que vejo como problemas emsua apresentação da virtude como uma forma de conhecimento, e sua proposta – corporificada natese da unidade das virtudes – de que as virtudes comumente reconhecidas deveriam ser vistascomo manifestações parciais da virtude enquanto tal. Também enfocarei a assertiva de McDowellde que (...) o conhecimento que constitui a virtude não pode ser visto como tendo um conteúdoproposicional que se preste a uma codificação em princípios de conduta – a tese de nãocodificabilidade– e a relação da postura pessoal de McDowell com a empreitada mais ampla daética de virtudes. (shrink)